Moral reasoning traditionally distinguishes two types of evil:moral (ME) and natural (NE). The standard view is that ME is the product of human agency and so includes phenomena such as war,torture and psychological cruelty; that NE is the product of nonhuman agency, and so includes natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, disease and famine; and finally, that more complex cases are appropriately analysed as a combination of ME and NE. Recently, as a result of developments in autonomous agents in cyberspace, (...) a new class of interesting and important examples of hybrid evil has come to light. In this paper, it is called artificial evil (AE) and a case is made for considering it to complement ME and NE to produce a more adequate taxonomy. By isolating the features that have led to the appearance of AE, cyberspace is characterised as a self-contained environment that forms the essential component in any foundation of the emerging field of Computer Ethics (CE). It is argued that this goes someway towards providing a methodological explanation of why cyberspace is central to so many of CE's concerns; and it is shown how notions of good and evil can be formulated in cyberspace. Of considerable interest is how the propensity for an agent's action to be morally good or evil can be determined even in the absence of biologically sentient participants and thus allows artificial agents not only to perpetrate evil (and fort that matter good) but conversely to `receive' or `suffer from' it. The thesis defended is that the notion of entropy structure, which encapsulates human value judgement concerning cyberspace in a formal mathematical definition, is sufficient to achieve this purpose and, moreover, that the concept of AE can be determined formally, by mathematical methods. A consequence of this approach is that the debate on whether CE should be considered unique, and hence developed as a Macroethics, may be viewed, constructively,in an alternative manner. The case is made that whilst CE issues are not uncontroversially unique, they are sufficiently novel to render inadequate the approach of standard Macroethics such as Utilitarianism and Deontologism and hence to prompt the search for a robust ethical theory that can deal with them successfully. The name Information Ethics (IE) is proposed for that theory. Itis argued that the uniqueness of IE is justified by its being non-biologically biased and patient-oriented: IE is an Environmental Macroethics based on the concept of data entity rather than life. It follows that the novelty of CE issues such as AE can be appreciated properly because IE provides a new perspective (though not vice versa). In light of the discussion provided in this paper, it is concluded that Computer Ethics is worthy of independent study because it requires its own application-specific knowledge and is capable of supporting a methodological foundation, Information Ethics. (shrink)

The paper provides a critical review of the debate on the foundations of Computer Ethics (CE). Starting from a discussion of Moor’s classic interpretation of the need for CE caused by a policy and conceptual vacuum, five positions in the literature are identified and discussed: the “no resolution approach”, according to which CE can have no foundation; the professional approach, according to which CE is solely a professional ethics; the radical approach, according to which CE deals with absolutely unique issues, (...) in need of a unique approach; the conservative approach, according to which CE is only a particular applied ethics, discussing new species of traditional moral issues; and the innovative approach, according to which theoretical CE can expand the metaethical discourse with a substantially new perspective. In the course of the analysis, it is argued that, although CE issues are not uncontroversially unique, they are sufficiently novel to render inadequate the adoption of standard macroethics, such as Utilitarianism and Deontologism, as the foundation of CE and hence to prompt the search for a robust ethical theory. Information Ethics (IE) is proposed for that theory, as the satisfactory foundation for CE. IE is characterised as a biologically unbiased extension of environmental ethics, based on the concepts of information object/infosphere/entropy rather than life/ecosystem/pain. In light of the discussion provided in this paper, it is suggested that CE is worthy of independent study because it requires its own application-specific knowledge and is capable of supporting a methodological foundation, IE. (shrink)

ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Basic statements play a central role in Popper's "The Logic of Scientific Discovery", since they permit a distinction between empirical and non-empirical theories. A theory is empirical iff it consists of falsifiable statements, and statements (of any kind) are falsifiable iff they are inconsistent with at least one basic statement. Popper obviously presupposes that basic statements are themselves empirical and hence falsifiable; at any rate, he claims several times that they are falsifiable. In this paper we prove that (...) no basic statement is falsifiable, if the term 'basic statement' is to be understood according to Popper's definitions of that term. More precisely, we prove not only that no Popperian basic statement in the narrow sense of the word is falsifiable, but also that no Popperian basic statement in the broader sense, and even in the broadest possible sense, is falsifiable. This leads to the paradoxical result that, according to Popper's definitions of 'basic statement', the basis of the empirical sciences is not itself empirical. Furthermore, we point out a similar paradox as regards Popper's falsifiability scheme for theories. We close with a look at possibilities for overcoming these paradoxes. DEUTSCHE ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Basissätze spielen eine zentrale Rolle in Poppers Logik der Forschung, denn sie erlauben die Unterscheidung zwischen empirischen und nichtempirischen Theorien: Eine Theorie ist empirisch genau dann, wenn sie aus falsifizierbaren Aussagesätzen besteht, und Aussagesätze (beliebiger Art) sind falsifizierbar genau dann, wenn sie mindestens einem Basissatz widersprechen. Popper setzt offensichtlich voraus, dassŸ die Basissätze selbst empirisch und somit falsifizierbar sind. Jedenfalls behauptet er mehrmals ihre Falsifizierbarkeit. Wir beweisen in unserem Aufsatz, dassŸ die Basissätze nicht falsifizierbar sind, und wir beweisen dies nicht nur für Poppersche Basissätze im engeren Sinn, sondern auch für Poppersche Basissätze im weiteren Sinn und schlieߟlich für Poppersche Basissätze im weitesten, mit den Vorstellungen Poppers gerade noch verträglichen Sinn. Dies führt zu dem paradoxen Ergebnis, dass nach Poppers eigenen methodologischen Postulaten die Basis der empirischen Wissenschaften nicht selbst empirisch ist. Darüber hinaus entwickeln wir ein ähnliches Paradoxon bezüglich Poppers Falsifizierbarkeitsschema für Theorien. Zum AbschlussŸ unseres Aufsatzes betrachten wir einige Möglichkeiten, die von uns entdeckten Paradoxa zu überwinden. (shrink)

This paper outlines the qualitative foundations of a “quasiclassical” theory in which particles are pictured as spatially extended periodic excitations of a universal background field, interacting with each other via nonlinearity in the equations of motion for that field, and undergoing collapse to a much smaller volume if and when they are detected. The theory is based as far as possible directly on experiment, rather than on the existing quantum mechanical formalism, and it offers simple physical interpretations of such concepts (...) as mass, 4-momentum, interaction, potentials, and quantization; it may lead directly to the standard equations of quantum theory, such as the multiparticle Schrödinger equation, without going through the conventional process of “quantizing” a classical theory. The theory also provides an alternative framework in which to discuss wave-particle duality and the quantum “measurement problem”; in particular, it is suggested that the unpredictability of quantum phenomena may arise from “deterministic chaos” in the behavior of the background field. (shrink)

In this paper an attempt is made to interpret inertial mass as a consequence of the invariant periodicity associated with physical de Broglie waves. In the case of a free particle, such waves, observed from an arbitrary reference frame, would exhibit the velocity-dependent wavelength given by de Broglie's relation; and it is conjectured that the inertial and additive properties of mass (or, more precisely, the conservation of momentum and energy) can be related to nonlinear interference effects occurring between the de (...) Broglie waves for different particles. This picture could throw light on the physical meaning of quantization and suggests the possibility of reformulating classical and quantum mechanics in terms of a “quasi-classical” nonlinear field theory in which both inertial and quantization effects result essentially from the periodicity of de Broglie waves. (shrink)

The author has recently proposed a “quasi-classical” theory of particles and interactions in which particles are pictured as extended periodic disturbances in a universal field χ(x, t), interacting with each other via nonlinearity in the equation of motion for χ. The present paper explores the relationship of this theory to nonrelativistic quantum mechanics; as a first step, it is shown how it is possible to construct from χ a configuration-space wave function Ψ(x 1,x 2,t), and that the theory requires that (...) Ψ satisfy the two-particle Schrödinger equation in the case where the two particles are well separated from each other. This suggests that the multiparticle Schrödinger equation can be obtained as a direct consequence of the quasi-classical theory without any use of the usual formalism (Hilbert space, quantization rules, etc.) of conventional quantum theory and in particular without using the classical canonical treatment of a system as a “crutch” theory which has subsequently to be “quantized.” The quasi-classical theory also suggests the existence of a preferred “absolute” gauge for the electromagnetic potentials. (shrink)

It is shown that an approach to quantum phenomena in which charged particles are treated as macroscopically extended periodic disturbances in a nonlinear c-number field, interacting with each other via massless excitations of that field, leads almost uniquely to the five basic equations of classical electrodynamics: the Lorentz force law and Maxwell's equations. The fundamental electromagnetic quantity in this approach is the 4-vector potential Aα—interpreted absolutely as a measure of the local shift of each particle off its mass shell—rather than (...) theE andB fields, and it thus provides a new viewpoint on the questions of Aharonov-Bohm phase shifts, the existence of magnetic monopoles, and the role of gauge invariance. (shrink)

Our report and bibliography concentrate on research in the philosophy of science carried out in Austria within the last 20 years. The term 'philosophy of science' is here to be understood in the broad sense of 'Wissenschaftstheorie', that is, syntactics, semantics and pragmatics of the natural sciences and of the humanities, including law. After a general introduction to the philosophy of science scene in Austria, we report about those institutions in Austria at which relevant research has been conducted, starting with (...) institutions in Graz and then continuing - in alphabetical order - with institutions in Innsbruck, Klagenfurt, Linz, Salzburg, and Wien. Our report is supplemented by a bibliography; please note that this contains only references to original publications which deal mainly with questions in the philosophy of science, hence no contributions to lexica, no reviews, no translations, no articles in mass media, no editorial and no unpublished works are cited. Finally, there is an appendix, Alphabetical List of Austrian Institutions at which Philosophy of Science is Conducted, to facilitate communication between you and Austrian philosophers in whose work you may become interested by reading this report. (shrink)

‘Learning to be job ready’ (L2BJR) was a pilot scheme involving 16 long-term unemployed people from a range of backgrounds being offered a 6-month paid placement within the care department of a city council in Northern England. The project was based on a partnership with the largest college in the city specialising in post-16 education and training for residents and employees. The college targeted people as potential candidates for the programme through their prior attendance on or interest in care courses (...) at the college, rather than the council employing more traditional methods of recruitment. Surveys, focus groups and interviews were utilised to capture the views and experiences of the participants, project workers and line managers, and also evidence of the project’s impact on service delivery in the care department. The article adds to our conceptual and practical knowledge of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the public sector in three distinct ways. From a social and business perspective, the findings of the research highlight a potentially more robust strategy for matching long-term unemployed citizens to training and job opportunities in the public sector than is otherwise possible through the more conventional route of the job centre. Secondly, through this approach and with appropriate pre-training, a greater understanding of and empathy for the service users can be developed in the new organisational members, strengthening the subsequent ethical delivery and quality of the service. Finally, a re-conceptualisation of Carroll’s influential model of CSR, which also specifically incorporates the ethical and social inclusion duties of public sector organisations not only as service providers but also as potential employers, offers a more tailored paradigm for understanding this unique yet under-researched element of CSR theory and practice. (shrink)

In 1947, Jacques Maritain argued before the UN that “men mutually opposed in their theoretical conceptions can come to a merely practical agreement regarding a list of human rights.” Maritain justified this thesis using a progressive theory of the natural law which rests on a distinction between the natural law as operative in human nature and the natural law as known and articulated. Drawing on Maritain’s 1951 Man and the State, this essay defends a MacIntyrian reading of Maritain’s thesis and (...) its plausibility against four objections from Ralph McInerny, Charles Taylor, and Alasdair MacIntyre himself. (shrink)